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Four years ago John Redmond wrote an aptly titled book "The Next Mediterranean Enlargement
of the European Community: Turkey, Cyprus and Malta?" (1) in which he discussed the
prospects and pitfalls of each country in its quest to join the European Community. The book
appeared just before the European Commission had published its separate opinions on the
applications launched three years earlier, in July 1990, by Malta and Cyprus to join the
Community, which event symbolically occurred during Italy’s turn at the Presidency of the
Union. As such therefore Redmond’s book could not take into account the Commission’s
appraisal of the Maltese and Cypriot applications, however the analysis was quite on the mark
and it appeared then that the author had neatly summed up all the major points on the question of
the next Mediterranean enlargement. Briefly his conclusions were that:
(a) Turkey would not be admitted into the Community in the foreseeable future but would have
to content itself with an enhanced Association Agreement, something which actually came about
through the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement signed in 1995.
(b) As for Cyprus and Malta, though no serious economic obstacles to their joining the
Community were envisaged, both posed the problem of "smallness" and the difficulties this
raised as regards the effectiveness of the Union’s institutions. With regard to Cyprus there was
the additional problem presented by the de facto division of the island. Malta’s neutral status
could also present difficulties while it was hard to envisage the Community accepting Malta’s
membership while denying it to Cyprus. The two applications were thus being linked.
2Since then, much water has passed under the bridge as it were. After concluding the Customs
Union agreement with the Union, Turkey has become even more assertive in its demands for
membership and has said time and again that it would not tolerate Cyprus’s membership of the
Union (2). Former Turkish Prime Minister and current Foreign Minister Mrs Ciller has been
even more specific. Just before the start of the Dublin summit she said that there are three
reasons why Turkey is taking part in the next enlargement of the Union: "...we are the first
country to have signed an agreement that provides for enlargement, we are the only applicant
that is a member of NATO, we are the only country that has achieved a degree of integration
(with the EU) represented by the customs union that came into force just one year ago" (3).
Speaking at a dinner in Dublin, Mrs Ciller repeated Turkey’s desire to join the EU in the next
enlargement adding that if the EU had good relations with Turkey, the Cypriot problem could be
settled more easily (4). These comments and some sharp criticism against Greece, drew a mild
rebuke from Greece’s foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos while his deputy, George
Papandreou said that Europe expects a sincere effort from her (5). It remains to be seen how
much longer will the EU be able to resist the relentless Turkish pressure that has been going on
for some time and whether Turkey is ready for some new diplomatic initiative at finally
resolving the Cyprus issue in return for a place in the Union.
In another development, the European Union has accepted that negotiations with Cyprus and
Malta would begin six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference. However, the
Cyprus Problem is still considered by many member states, though of course not officially, as a
very serious obstacle to Cypriot membership. Meanwhile, following the change in government in
October 1996, Malta has indicated that for the foreseeable future it is no longer interested in
membership but wants instead to conclude a free trade agreement with the Union accompanied
by a security protocol, providing guarantees for Malta’s security. Malta was not represented at
the Dublin summit with the other applicant countries. European Commission President, Jacques
Santer, replying to a question by a journalist said that since the change in government, Malta was
no longer a candidate for membership (6). The official position in Malta is that the application is
frozen, not retracted. All these developments indicate that suddenly there is fresh momentum as
well as uncertainty about the direction which the next Mediterranean enlargement will take and
the question posed by Redmond in 1993 looks like needing a fresh and closer examination once
again.
This paper will seek first of all to show the developments that have occurred in the EU’s
relations with the Mediterranean applicants in the 1990s. Following that, the analysis will focus
on the main implications for the Union of the next Mediterranean enlargement and its likely
impact on the applicant states. The last part of the paper will take the form of a discussion of the
possible path which the next Mediterranean enlargement will follow.
From the Launching of the Applications to the Present
The first country from the Mediterranean group to launch its application was Turkey, which did
so on the 14th of April 1987. The Commission’s Opinion on Turkey’s application came out at
the end 1989 (7). Turkey’s relations with the European Community date back to 1963 when it
became the second Mediterranean country after Greece to sign an Association Agreement with
the Community. As a key member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and other
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Dardanells and facing the Caucasus, during the cold war close links with the Community were
considered as helping to achieve the political and strategic aims of strengthening Nato’s southern
flank by stabilising Turkey’s internal economic and social situation. The end of the cold war
diminished Turkey’s traditional importance for the West, though strong arguments can still be
made about the West’s interest in Turkey as a key country on the doorstep of the turbulent
Middle East and Central Asia, not to mention the importance of supporting and upholding the
Turkish secular state as a model for the newly independent Moslem states of central Asia. Indeed
one can argue, Turkey’s role in this sense will be akin to that of a surrogate power of the West, a
position which Turkey will not accept without some compensatory favour from Europe. By
gaining greater influence among the Turkic former Soviet Republics after the vacuum created by
the collapse of the Soviet Union, it will counter Iranian influence and ambitions in the region. All
these arguments however have not been enough to tip the balance in favour of Turkey’s EC
application when put against the background of her comparatively low level of economic
development, its rapidly growing population (with the added consideration that as a member of
the Union, Turkey could in a short time span become one of the most populous countries of the
Community) and the impact which such a large underdeveloped, agrarian country would have on
the Community’s structural funds, agricultural policy and budget - not to mention migration (8).
In the background of course there is the Greek factor or the way Greece uses its EU membership
to condition Turkish behaviour in general and block her membership. In its 1989 Opinion on the
Turkish application, the Commission had not recommended the start of negotiations with Turkey
on the excuse that at that particular moment the Community was still putting in place the single
market, was about to embark on economic and monetary union and moreover was involved in
the task of "improving its institutions and thereby reconciling enlargement and consolidation".
The Commission held that on the basis of these considerations alone "it would be unwise, with
regard both to the candidate countries and to the Member States, to envisage the Community
becoming involved in new accession negotiations before 1993 at the earliest, except in
exceptional cases" (9). The "exceptional case" was soon invoked in the case of the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) applicants while Turkey’s application, whose Association Agreement
(10) envisaged eventual EU membership, though not automatically, was put on the back burners
as happened to the applications of Cyprus and Malta launched in 1990.
The EU’s treatment of Turkey is symptomatic of its changing international priorities, not least
those in the Mediterranean region. Since the late sixties and early seventies, soon after the
Community had more or less concluded the first phase of its internal integration, taking due
account of the cold war tensions and the Middle East Problem, in the latter case most
emphatically in the wake of the first and second oil shocks, the Community had regarded the
Mediterranean as a zone of instability whose problems could spillover into Europe itself. While
military threats and the overall strategic balance in the region could be countered by the presence
of the American sixth fleet, the Community used economic statecraft, especially discriminatory
trading preferences under the aegis of the Global Mediterranean Policy, in an effort to enhance
stability in the region, essentially by trying to alleviate the non-military threats to security. The
inclusion of Greece(1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) in the EC was a means of consolidating
the new democratic process which began in each of these states in the first half of the seventies.
In the late eighties, at the time of Turkey’s application, no such prerogatives existed which
would have presented the Community with the strong motivation to include her in its fold.
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became preoccupied with two main issues: first to bring to a successful conclusion the
consolidation of Western European integration by admitting the EFTA countries and secondly by
events in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover the emerging problems and priorities in the
Mediterranean region, to which the EU was rather slow to react, characterised by population
growth, migratory pressures on Europe, terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and the spread of
Islamic fundamentalism lessened Turkey’s attractiveness, the perception being that Turkey could
possibly aggravate, rather than diminish these pressures. Then there was Turkish intransigence
on Cyprus and its dismal human rights record. Turkey missed the boat when Greece joined in
1981 and it appears that it will have to struggle to reverse this setback.
In the case of Cyprus and Malta, the situation was different. Both island states had initially
become interested in forging an Association Agreement with the Community in 1961, following
Britain’s first application to join. Both concluded an Association Agreement with the
Community in the early seventies (11). In contrast with Turkey, their level of economic
development compares favourably if not better than that of other southern EU member
states.With a population of 0.4 million and 0.7 million respectively, Malta and Cyprus are
unimportant for the EU both when considered as a market outlet for the Union’s exports as well
as regards their impact on the Community’s finances and other main economic policies in the
membership scenario (12). This was more or less confirmed by the Commission’s Opinions (13)
on their applications published in 1993, which nevertheless indicated a number of economic
sectors each applicant had to seek to modernise in preparation for membership. On the basis of
these observations, a "Structured Dialogue" commenced between the Union and each of the
applicants to usher in the priority reforms. This dialogue is still going on, though doubts have
been cast as to whether it will continue with Malta, given the latter’s decision to effectively
freeze its membership application.
Since both applicants are "micro-states", in its opinions, the Commission referred to the
additional difficulty common to both concerning the impact of their membership on the Union’s
institutions (14). At the Lisbon European Council of June 1992, the Benelux countries submitted
a memorandum urging the Community to tackle the institutional issue in a way that would not be
detrimental to smaller countries. The Benelux trio made it clear that on the basis of the
considerations they submitted, membership should be open to the EFTA countries but not to the
Mediterranean applicants (15). This killed any hope there might have been of an early entry in
the Union of one or both of the Mediterranean applicants. Since the Community always insisted
that each application should be treated on its merits, the Maltese authorities (16) had hoped for
an early accession with the EFTA group without having to wait for Cyprus basing their
judgement on the relatively unproblematic nature of Malta's application (17). As for Cyprus, the
Commission declared that there is a link between the question of enlargement and the problem
which results from the de facto separation of the island into two entities (18). Thus the general
view was that Cypriot membership would take a long time to materialise and Malta’s bid should
not be held back on its account. When presenting its application, the Cypriot Government did so
on behalf of the whole island. In line with the relevant UN resolutions, the EU recognises only
the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and not the administration of the Northern Turkish
part, the so called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This move was severely
criticised by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities, basing their legal position on the Geneva Treaty of
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President of Cyprus, in the latter case (and constitutionally) a Turkish Cypriot, each had a veto
over any foreign policy decision, particularly on any decision on joining an international
organisation or alliance that does not count both Greece and Turkey among its members (20). In
its Opinion on the Cypriot application, the Commission, came out strongly against the prospect
of the Union "internalising" the Cyprus Problem, reiterating clearly that accession negotiations
with Cyprus could only begin after a solution to the problem had been found (21). However,
should the inter communal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots not lead anywhere, the
Commission proposed that the situation should be reassessed and the question of Cyprus’s
accession to the Community be reconsidered in January 1995 (22). No doubt the latter provision
was intended in order not to give Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots complete leverage in the inter
communal negotiations with the Greek-Cypriots.
In Malta’s case, the Commission’s main observation, apart from those already indicated, was that
although the Maltese Government had affirmed that it is in Malta’s interest to subscribe to the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, this did not alter the fact that it might be necessary to
amend the constitution which incorporates Malta’s status of neutrality based on non-alignment
(23). Such an amendment requires a two thirds majority in Parliament. The Maltese Government
consistently maintained that Malta’s neutrality was sui generis and that just as other neutral states
were participating in the EU, Malta would have no difficulties doing the same with its special
brand of neutrality (24). However, the Labour Party has continuously maintained that
membership could have a detrimental effect on the maintenance of stability in the Mediterranean.
On the insistence of Greece, the European Council held in Corfu in June 1994 established that
the next enlargement will include Cyprus and Malta (25). At the end of the summit, Greek
Minister Theodoros Pangalos noted that the Council’s decision meant that "the question of the
admission of Cyprus, was disassociated from the political problem of Cyprus" (26). In the first
half of 1995, Greece blocked progress on the EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement and the
transfer of EC financial aid to Turkey in order to force the latter to drop its opposition to Cyprus
joining the EU before the Cyprus Question had been resolved. Concurrently, Greece pushed its
EU partners to fix a date for the opening of negotiations with Malta and Cyprus. After a decision
reached within the general affairs Council in April, the Cannes European Council of June 1995
reaffirmed that negotiations with Cyprus and Malta would begin six months after the end of the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), taking into account the outcome of the conference (27).
The implication is that if the IGC is concluded in the first half of 1997, negotiations with Malta
and Cyprus could begin towards the end of 1997.
The Impact of the Next Mediterranean Enlargement on the European Union and
on the Mediterranean Applicants
One of the ways of discussing the impact of EU membership on the Mediterranean applicants is
to frame the argument in the context of the "costs of non-membership", something which will be
attempted in this section. The EU’s reluctance to include the Mediterranean applicants together
with the EFTA group, couched in terms of the negative impact that this would have on the
Union’s institutions was a screen behind which the Union said no to Turkey because it was too
big and underdeveloped, no to Cyprus because of the Cyprus Problem and no to Malta because it
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specifically that of reducing the democratic deficit and making them more effective, is a crucial
issue especially in the context of enlargement. Concurrently and paradoxically it was the EU
itself which gave the impression that in effect the question of the reform of the institutions was a
"non-issue" as an obstacle to membership when it temporarily waived the need for institutional
reform prior to enlargement in the case of the EFTA applicants, with of course the proper
safeguards that the matter would be discussed fully and without reservations at the IGC. The
same provisions which were included in the Accession Treaties concluded with the EFTA
countries, safeguarding future institutional reforms, could certainly be made binding for the
Mediterranean applicants (28). When the Mediterranean applicants eventually join the EU, the
matter will by then hopefully have been settled. Turkey’s size would however make it the biggest
member state and hence the most important one in all the Union’s institutions. On the other hand,
one lingering doubt is whether the smaller Mediterranean applicants will be able to handle their
participation in the institutions as efficiently as would be required of them, given their obvious
limited supply of human and other resources and the widening breath and depth of decision-
making in the EU both as concerns its internal development as well as its external relations. In
reply, reference is made to the way in which Luxembourg has successfully acquitted itself in
such situations so far. However, this is not a sufficient answer to such doubts.
The economic impact on the Community of the next Mediterranean enlargement is expected to
be negligible in the case of Cyprus and Malta. In the case of Turkey the Union will gain access to
a large market which in population terms would be larger than that incorporated in the Union
with the first Mediterranean enlargement. Turkey’s population being relatively young and
growing may produce migratory pressures on the rest of Europe which however, for exactly
contrary demographic developments should find this positive rather than negative. It is also
important to note that the Turkish economy has been expanding faster than the OECD average in
recent years and for the next three years, growth is expected to reach three times the forecast
OECD average. Unemployment, currently at 6.8 per cent and falling compares favourably with
most OECD economies. These indicators show that migratory flows resulting from economic
pressures may become less intense. The most serious challenge of enlargement will be felt in the
Union’s finances and especially the Structural Funds. Again in this regard, the entry of Cyprus
and Malta is unimportant for the EU, however the three applicants’ level of development entitles
them on the basis of present rules, for each to be considered as a single Objective One region,
which taking into account Turkey’s population size would entitle it to about six times the current
transfers to Greece. Considering the aid from the structural funds, membership is a definite
positive advantage for the applicants and a headache for the Union, which, since it will also have
to tackle the challenges of integrating the Central and Eastern European countries, will need to
overhaul its finances. This will not be an easy matter. The issue promises to be a very divisive
one and while some countries wish it to be discussed at the IGC, others think that given its
magnitude and the fact that the present financial perspective ends in 1999, the IGC should not be
overburdened with it. Meanwhile there is the usual conflict of interests between net recipients
and net contributors. The former do not wish their position to be undermined by enlargement.
Thus, in an initial document submitted in January 1995 to the IGC, Greece emphasised the
importance of economic and social cohesion and of transfers from the structural funds to the
poorer regions of the Community. It proposed that enlargement will require a greater budgetary
effort. By contrast, Germany a net contributor to the Community’s own resources has declared
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discussed at the IGC (29). There is yet another aspect: in the second Delors package approved by
the Edinburgh European Council, funds allocated to the structural programmes were doubled
while at the same time agriculture expenditure is expected to decline from 51 to 46 per cent of
the financial resources by 1999. Given these trends as well as developments in the World Trade
Organisation regarding the regulation of world trade in agricultural goods and further reforms of
the CAP (30), this shift may be expected to continue. However, it may not result in more funds
flowing to the Mediterranean backward regions of the Union, given that a substantial part of the
present transfers occur under the aegis of the Common Agricultural Policy. The most important
question does not only concern the division of the Community budget, though this cannot be
ignored, but the quantum by which the Community’s own resources will increase to allow it to
meet all the challenges. One possible way of lessening the pressure on the Community’s budget
is to deny agricultural support to new members from here onwards. EU Agriculture
Commissioner Franz Fischler recently indicated this approach as a plausible way forward: "...we
see no reason why the compensatory payments we make to our farmers should also apply to the
countries of central and eastern Europe, where there is actually nothing to be compensated for
and the farmers will benefit from the rise of prices after enlargement"(31). The same reasons
could be applied to the Mediterranean applicants. Indeed, Turkey’s agricultural sector could
benefit from membership simply from the price differential between the pre-accession price level
in Turkey and the higher EU prices upon membership. However, the general price level of food
products in Turkey will also increase. Symmetrical developments in Cyprus and Malta are
doubtful or less critical. The basic difficulty in ushering in such a system of support as proposed
by Fischler is to determine the criteria on who will and who will not receive agricultural
subsidies.
The theoretical and practical debate on the effect of the structural funds on economic growth and
regional convergence is essential not only for the Union as it approaches enlargement but also
for the applicant countries. In a very interesting study, Leonardi (32) has shown how between
1950 and 1991, there has been a significant reduction in the cohesion gap between core and
periphery regions in the Union and how EC allocations from the structural funds made a
substantial contribution to economic growth in Spain and Portugal after joining the Community
in 1986 (33). Greece of course was singled out as a special case since for various supply-side
considerations it was unable to obtain the same positive results following membership. The fifth
periodic report prepared by the Commission on the social and economic situation and
development of the regions of the Community showed that although the gap between core and
periphery remains significant and while concurrently the performance of the lagging regions
varies from one to the other, there is an overall trend towards gradual convergence (34). This
trend is supported by the structural funds and the initial estimate made by the Commission as
regards the effect of the structural funds over the period 1994-99 shows that in regions eligible
for aid, growth is expected to be higher than would have been the case without Community aid
by 2.5 per cent in Spain and 3.0 per cent in the case of Portugal and Greece (35). These results
are an added reason why the Mediterranean applicants should find membership of the EU more
attractive. In so far as they are unable to mobilise financial resources - whether originating
domestically or externally - to achieve similar results, the Mediterranean countries remain
comparatively disadvantaged vis a vis their direct competitors in the Union, namely the
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before the Mediterranean applicants), as long as they remain out of the Community.
The above considerations are what one may summarise as the static effects of membership. Due
consideration must also be given to the dynamic effects of integration, especially to the impact of
the single market. A recent study by the European Commission on the effects of the Single
Market Programme for the period 1987-93 shows that an additional 300,000 to 900,000 jobs
were created in the EU than would have existed in the absence of the single market. This was
accompanied by an extra increase in EU income of 1.1 to 1.5 per cent, a lowering of the inflation
rate of between 1.0 and 1.5 per cent and an increase in economic convergence and cohesion
between the regions (36). These trends may be reinforced by the successful launching of the third
and final stage of monetary union and the introduction of the single currency. While they remain
out of the Union, the Mediterranean applicants cannot benefit from these developments.
Moreover, the alternative of maintaining the present status of their links with the EU - a customs
union in the case of Cyprus and Turkey and a future free trade area in industrial products in the
case of Malta - is unattractive because it entails that the Mediterranean trio will have to adapt a
substantive part of the Community’s acquis without the benefit of representation in the Union’s
institutions or financial aid from the structural funds. Customs union and free trade area
agreements between the EU and third countries are taking on a different aspect to what they were
in the past and not only do they include the traditional dismantling of tariff barriers and
quantitative restrictions but also the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade and the approximation
of laws such as those covering the protection of intellectual, industrial and commercial property;
competition rules to ensure fair competition; rules governing public procurement and
harmonisation of taxation. For example, the Commission has recently published a draft common
position to be adopted by Council with a view to an EU-Turkey Association Council decision,
listing the Community instruments which Turkey will have to adopt in order to remove technical
barriers to trade. The list, some hundred odd pages of legislative headings excluding texts,
represents well over a thousand pieces of legislation (37). In the case of a customs union there is
the additional requirement for non-members of adopting the Union’s external commercial policy
without having a say in its implementation. Further, Cyprus and Malta, whose economies are
becoming more service-oriented may also wish for the additional requirement of free movement
of services to get more advantage of a closer association with the Union. Agricultural trade with
third countries, even with those enjoying preferential access in the Community, will continue to
be restricted in the foreseeable future affecting Turkey and Cyprus most particularly and to a
lesser extent Malta while they remain out of the EU. Hence, while membership requires
adaptation effort on the part of the applicants, the costs of non-membership appear to be worse.
There is also the question of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In this regard the choice between
membership and non-membership is not neutral. The applicant countries in central and eastern
Europe will exercise a strong gravitational pull on FDI to the comparative detriment of the
Mediterranean applicants should these opt to stay out of the EU. Mediterranean backward
regions of the EU which receive aid from the Structural Funds are also direct competitors of non-
member states for FDI.
Finally consideration must be given to the bargaining strength of the applicant countries outside
membership. As applicants engaged in the "structured dialogue" with the Community, Cyprus
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being involved in a continuous dialogue and joint decision-making on the priority reforms with a
status of quasi membership. Of course the relationship was not devoid of problems.In the case of
Malta one gets the impression that little negotiating took place with the Community on the
reform schedule. However, outside the Community the applicant countries will still have to
negotiate bilaterally with a vastly superior Union and according to the momentum dictated by the
latter.
On the Union’s side there is the question of the Mediterranean applicants’ readiness to join the
last stage of EMU. Following the Lisbon European summit of June 1992, the EU has adopted the
stance that in enlargement negotiations, the requirements of membership are to be based on the
Treaty on European Union. Therefore applicant countries are to make parallel progress on
achieving both membership as well as in ushering in the changes needed to integrate fully in the
new Union. Both Cyprus (39) and Malta claim that they are within easy reach of achieving the so
called Maastricht nominal convergence criteria and therefore their membership may not present
problems to the Union in this regard. Indeed, Cyprus and Malta have enjoyed very rapid and high
economic growth achieving full-employment conditions (Cyprus has even had to import Labour
to overcome a shortage which has developed) and comparatively low inflation hovering around 4
per cent in both cases. Cyprus is closer to achieving a fiscal deficit of around 3.0 per cent of
GDP, one of the main Maastricht convergence criteria, than is Malta, whose deficit presently
stands at around 9.3 per cent of GDP. For Cyprus and Malta, achieving the Maastricht criteria is
not a painless task and though the authorities in both applicant countries are optimistic, more
sanguine appraisals of the situation in both countries have been aired. As regards Cyprus,
Theophanous (40) has argued that in the case of one of the criteria, i.e. public debt, if due
consideration is taken of intragovernment debt, total public debt would amount to 88.7 per cent
of GDP. In the case of Malta, Cordina (41) pointed to a number of difficulties but primarily to
the ones connected with establishing the real size of public debt, problems with controlling
inflation and long-term interest rates and lastly problems with determining the exchange rate of
the Malta lira, presently established by the Central Bank on the basis of a formula of a basket of
currencies. Since the weight of the ECU in the basket is around two thirds, it is not surprising
that the Malta lira has been so stable against the ECU. Turkey’s case is worse. Traditionally a
high inflation country, the general price level peaked at 107.0 per cent in 1994 but started
declining there after. Present estimates show that it would go down to 65.0 per cent in 1998 (42).
No doubt the effects of the customs union and liberalisation will exercise a downward pressure
on prices in the long run, however in the short to medium term the effects will be more mixed.
Pressures are already being felt on Turkey’s current account balance as a result of the customs
union with the EU. Longer-term interest rates remain high. The Government’s financial deficit as
a percentage of GDP is not being contained and nor is public borrowing. All indicators are that
Turkey will need a very long time to achieve the criteria for the final stage of EMU.
The last consideration concerns the applicants’ participation in the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. In this respect, Turkey is the least problematic being a full
member of NATO and an Associate member of the Western European Union (WEU). In
international politics Cyprus has been a co-founder of the non-aligned movement (NAM) and an
active participant in it since. Malta joined the NAM much later. The NAM has enabled both
applicants to forge more links with the developing countries, though this does not appear to have
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translated into trade opportunities which remain directed towards geographically proximate
regions. Further, as Commonwealth countries, they already enjoy close relations with a number
of former colonies of Great Britain, most of them linked to the EU by the Lome Convention.
These links may serve the EU well when Cyprus and Malta eventually join the Union. They have
actively participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now
OSCE) and have worked closely with the neutral states which are now members of the EU. Thus
they are not complete novices to the problems of European security and as micro-states they
view the Union as a "security community". Cyprus has special relations with its Arab neighbours
in the Mashrek, Malta has links with most Arab countries. As micro-states they lack power in the
international system and hence are feared by no one and so they can serve as trustworthy
interlocutors between the Mediterranean non-member states and the Union. They will certainly
add to the Mediterranean dimension of the EU which is in danger of being submerged in the
predominantly central and northern European nature of the Union and more so in the Union-to-
be. Their traditional weakness in terms of overall power in the international system coupled with
their neutrality and non-alignment when added to the influence already exercised by the current
EU neutrals, will serve as a mitigating and moderating influence in deliberations on foreign and
security policy within the EU. Being on the edges of the EU’s security sphere, the accession of
Cyprus and Malta will potentially make the core countries more sensitive (sensitise them)to the
problems of the Union’s southern periphery. However, the Labour Party has expressed fears of
Malta being transformed into a fortress on the European frontier guarding against the Arab world
and vice-versa (43).
Of course the neutral leanings of Cyprus and Malta alarm those member states who want an
active and effective common foreign and security policy in an EU which will act, rather than
react. Many fear that the addition of Cyprus and Malta will water down the EU’s effectiveness in
international affairs, will raise the possibility of greater internal discord on policy among the
member states and consequently render decision-making more cumbersome. In the case of
Cyprus there is the well-founded fear that it will use its membership of the EU institutions to
team up with Greece against Turkey, especially as long as the latter remains outside the EU, thus
souring the Union’s relations with Turkey and further fomenting discord within NATO. This is
one reason why the Union would probably be better off if the Cyprus Question is resolved before
Cyprus joins the Union. Yet, Cyprus would argue that it is membership which will help resolve
the problem, not vice versa.
The effect of the accession of Cyprus and Malta in the EU on its foreign and security policy will
depend on the shape of the CFSP and its decision-making institutions which will emerge at the
end of the IGC, in other words how much will the security element and the WEU be integrated in
the EU and what scope will the Union have in these areas of policy? Will there be a European
foreign policy ? The other consideration is what sort of institutional set-up will be established?
Will the neutral and pacifist leaning member states be allowed to maintain the position adopted
by Denmark (44), which is permitted to have an observer status in the WEU and not to
participate in joint actions which have defence implications as well as the freedom to renounce
its right to exercise the Presidency of the Union in each case involving the elaboration and the
implementation of decisions and actions which have defence implications ? Denmark’s status
differs markedly from that which the EFTA applicants had to undertake as a precondition for
entry, namely that they would be able to participate in the CFSP from day one and to take on the
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entirety of objectives of the treaty and Title V there of 45. One suggestion put forward by the
"Reflection Group" on the IGC is that in the CFSP, some member states may be permitted not to
participate in defence actions so long as their abstention will not prevent a consensus from
forming and provided they show financial and political solidarity. The progress achieved in this
regard up to the Dublin European summit is that decision-making procedures will be improved in
two ways: first, where unanimity will still apply, it would be possible for member states who so
wish to make a declaration of constructive obstruction. In such a situation the member state
which makes such a declaration would not be obliged to apply the decision. The second, is that
qualified majority voting would be introduced for all decisions under the CFSP, except those
involving joint actions and those with military/defence implications. In the latter case, no vote
would be taken if a member state declared its intention to oppose the adoption of a decision for
stated reasons of national policy. In such eventualities, a qualified majority could ask to have the
issue referred to the Council of Heads of State or Government for decision by unanimity (46).
Such an arrangement would suit Malta’s participation in an enlarged EU (and probably also a
demilitarised Cyprus) because it would permit it to maintain its neutral status as defined in the
Constitution, by not joining a military alliance and by not having foreign military bases on its
soil while allowing her to participate fully in the EU’s foreign policy-making. However, even
such a limited obligation would not placate the wider questions related to the concept of
neutrality and the way this safeguards or otherwise Malta’s security. As Calvocoressi has
observed such a status would impair the would-be neutral’s claim to neutrality in the event of
war and to accept it implies, therefore, a certain view of European affairs - a view of Europe in
which there will be no overriding case for claiming neutrality in order to preserve the state’s
integrity and existence (47). On the other hand, the Maltese government holds that in the present
setting in the Mediterranean region neutrality serves towards safeguarding Malta’s security and
identity in the event of a plausible north/south conflict. This argument is reasonably valid if not
for the consideration that since Malta is unable to safeguard its own security, it has to seek
military guarantees from neighbouring powers and thus becomes indirectly involved in regional
military arrangements. The previous Maltese government (the Nationalist Administration 1987-
96) had declared that in the post-cold war era, neutrality had lost most if not all of its meaning
and that neutral countries were rethinking their international status. Presently Malta’s security is
guaranteed by Italy, however the latter’s intervention is not automatic and there is the possibility
it would choose not to act if wider interests prevail. Further, as a micro-state with extremely
limited military capabilities, Malta could eventually see its strategic reliance on Italy, already
accompanied by an economic dependence which has resulted from the financial and economic
aid which Italy has transferred to Malta over the past 15 years and still continues to, transformed
into a hegemonic relationship. By contrast, membership of the EU, which obviously is not a
military alliance but a security community, holds lesser risks all round.
What Will the Next Mediterranean Enlargement Be Like?
To answer this question, the case of each Mediterranean applicant will be discussed on its own




Up to Florence European summit many would have considered Malta’s application as leading
the pack of some eleven aspirants to EU membership. The October 1996, general election
returned the Labour Party to power in Valletta after an absence of nine years. The Labour Party
had campaigned against membership of the EU, proposing instead a free trade area agreement in
industrial goods over a reasonable transitional period.The Party reiterated that neutrality was still
important for Malta and that it was against membership of NATO’s "Partnership for Peace"
(PfP) programme. The Party also proposed co-operation with the EU in matters related to
security and foreign policy (48). Some days before the election, the party’s leader Dr Alfred Sant
said that Malta’s membership of the EU would harm Mediterranean stability and that Malta’s
security could best be safeguarded by maintaining a position where it will pose a threat to no
one, from the north or from the south (49). Shortly after the election, Malta announced that it
would not be attending the Dublin European summit while immediate action was taken in the
first days to pull Malta out of the PfP. The latter move was considered by some as the first sign
of a return to the previous anti-western and pro-Libyan policies. The Foreign Minister, Dr
George Vella, met the local heads of mission of the NATO countries and explained that the
move was "not a political measure aimed at distancing Malta from Europe" (50). Speaking a
few days later, the Foreign Minister said that Malta was not turning its back on Europe and that
in contrast with what had happened in the case of the PfP, there was no need for a formal
withdrawal of the EU membership application. The Labour Party had strongly campaigned in
favour of pulling Malta out of the PfP on the grounds that membership was unconstitutional. He
added that Malta would be continuing where the previous government had left off, taking on
board what had already been agreed and is good and hopefully building on it (51). Speaking to
the Chamber of Commerce, the new Prime Minister Dr Alfred Sant said that "for the foreseeable
future we are ruling out the prospect of Maltese membership of the EU in the full belief that on a
net basis, such membership would not be in the interest neither of Malta nor of Europe" (52).
Membership was not ruled out completely and the government is laying emphasis on the fact that
such a policy is for the "foreseeable future". The Federation of Industry (FOI) and the Chamber
of Commerce maintain that it is in Malta’s interest to join the European Union. In representations
to the political parties just before the election, the FOI warned that "it does not make sense for
Malta to stand alone in splendid isolation when its competitors...are uniting under the aegis of
different regional economic blocs" (53). Following the election, the FOI said in a meeting with
the newly appointed Minister for Industry, that uncertainty over Malta’s relations with the EU
would harm investment (54). In another development a member of the COREPER in Brussels
was reported to have said that there was no point in continuing the Structured Dialogue with
Malta once it was no longer interested in membership (55). The government’s position on
relations with the EU is amply clear, though some confusion has been created in Brussels over
what to do with the Structured Dialogue once Malta was making it abundantly clear that it was
not interested in pursuing the membership option. To clarify this "confusion", the Government
circulated an aide memoire (56) to all EU member states, explaining its position and reiterating
that Malta's foreign policy will remain oriented towards Europe while at the same time
cultivating a complimentary Mediterranean policy to it. The foreign Minister visited Brussels
and addressed the General Affairs Council explaining the new policy, adding that the
membership application had been put "on hold" while stating that Malta was fundamentally in
favour of European integration, though the present government did not see any role for Malta in
it for the foreseeable future. The Council instructed the Commission to begin consultations with
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Malta with a view of eventually starting negotiations aimed at establishing a new agreement with
her (57). With the same aim of clarifying Malta’s new policy the Prime Minister met his Italian
and Irish counterparts. Italy expressed disappointment at Malta’s change of policy, but promised
that it would help Malta achieve its aim of a closer relationship with the EU. Interviewed by a
Maltese journalist during the Irish European Summit, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was
reported to have said that Italy regarded the Mediterranean expansion as being very important
because the Union could not be an association of only Northern European countries. He added
that Italy would always be close to Malta, but the latter’s change of policy over Europe meant
that they would be less close. He reiterated the hope that Malta would eventually change its
stance once again on the issue (58). The Italian Government’s support of Malta’s EU
membership is also shared by the Italian opposition, Forza Italia.
The above indicates clearly that Malta's membership of the EU appears to be off for the
foreseeable future and the Government of Malta has the full popular mandate for this radical
change in policy. Much remains to be seen whether Malta's proposed alternative is achievable. It
will be uncharacteristic of the Community, given past experiences that it will conclude a new
agreement with Malta within the short and medium term. One example is the delay in concluding
the EC-Cyprus customs union agreement which got entangled in the labyrinth of negotiations
leading to the first Mediterranean enlargement, drastically slowing down the momentum of
progress in the negotiations despite the protestations of Cyprus. Given the present EU priorities -
concluding the IGC and the ratification process, embarking on the final stage of EMU and the
enlargement negotiations with the countries which are willing to go on with the process -
negotiations with Malta will be treated in the same manner as those with other Mediterranean
countries and possibly they will be delayed. It will also be difficult for Malta to negotiate a sui
generis relationship with the Union, first of all because the Brussels bureaucracy will find it
difficult to place Malta anywhere else than in an already existing pigeon box - in other words a
Mediterranean Partnership Agreement, a "Europe Agreement" or an EEA, EFTA-type one.
Moreover, the political will may be lacking on the part of the EU: in forging a relationship with
Malta, the EU may find it difficult to part from the beaten track for this will raise serious
precedents in its relations with other non-member countries. There is a historic negative
precedent as well: Malta’s 1981 request for a "special relationship" with the EC, proposed by
Dom Mintoff, had also been rejected by the Community and bilateral relations entered a very
difficult period.
Economically, Malta may be unable to maintain the momentum of economic development it has
sustained over the past decade outside the EU. Some allusions to this have already been made
above, however one important question is whether Malta can sustain a sufficient level of
economic growth by means of state mobilised finance. For how long can the state, already
running a deficit of 9.3 per cent of GDP continue to accelerate the economic development
process? A drastic policy of retrenchment of government spending to lower levels may
decelerate the process. Membership on the other hand will provide access to the structural funds
which will enable the present rate of economic development process to be continued.
On the political front, the EU has so far not concluded a defence pact with any third country such
as the one being requested by Malta. Even in this case the Union is being asked to traverse new,
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uncharted ground at a time when it has still not developed its foreign and security policy and the
instruments to deal with such problems.
The sort of package which Malta expects from EU membership is more or less known while the
outcome of the IGC up to the Dublin summit indicates clearly that some of Malta's hesitations -
for example that as a micro-state it will be submerged in a Union of much larger states - will not
materialise. These considerations may still lead the government to request a fresh mandate by
putting the question to the people in a referendum. Public opinion has not been properly
consulted so far on the issue. Lack of foresight on all sides has led to the question of EU
membership being treated more as a bipartisan issue than as a national one. In a small highly
politicised society such as Malta's, both main political parties which have alternated in power
since independence have shown extreme reluctance in properly informing the public or in
sponsoring a real national debate.
The final consideration is about Malta's security in and outside the Union. Malta's membership of
the EU will not affect the Union either way. However, the reverse is not the case. The analysis of
the security question is related to the regional context, the threats arising therefrom and the sort
of threats which Malta perceives. Today there is quasi unanimous consensus (59) that the major
threats to security in the Mediterranean are of a non-military nature. Most of the states of the
southern Mediterranean littoral are concerned with internal security issues widely related to the
possibility of state collapse because of the deteriorating economic situation and the protest
against the leading political elites in each country, probably for convenience under the banner of
Islam. There is even sufficient reasons to doubt whether an "international Islam" has emerged to
challenge the status quo even though it is known that Iran and Sudan have been aiding Islamic
movements in neighbouring states. Then there are the classical flash points such as the Middle
East, Cyprus and the situation in the Aegean (to mention a few) which could erupt from time to
time. However, these remain by and large circumscribed to a sub-region of the Mediterranean.
Another source of potential conflict comes from unresolved border issues and the demarcation of
the continental shelves. Malta is implicated in such disputes with its neighbours. The gradual
pacification of the Middle East problem is removing one of the unifying factors of the Arab
world. The states of the northern littoral are not perceived as a threat by those of the south - in
any case not a military threat (except in Tripoli) but an essential partner whose intrusive presence
is not feared but rather its lack of interest (60). This view is collaborated by Wohlfeld who
claims that though the southern states view the development of security and defence capabilities
of the northern Mediterranean states with suspicion, still broadly misinterpreting WEU/NATO
activities in the Mediterranean region, such as military exercises and the possibility of
humanitarian operations, on the other hand they are concerned that the western organisations'
increased interest in central and eastern Europe may develop at their expense (61). The Maltese
Government's premises on foreign policy appear flawed in at least this important respect judging
from the Labour Party's pronouncements, namely that "...when one considers the problems of our
region and the rift and tension which exists between the North and South, have paradoxically
escalated since the end of the cold war"(62). Indeed, the rift seems to have diminished. The
consensus in most of the countries of the Mediterranean region, appears to form around the need
of greater economic integration as well as more dialogue and collaboration in the field of
security especially in peace-keeping. That is why a security dialogue was inserted in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership commenced in Barcelona in 1995. By leaving the PfP and by
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declaring that it will not participate in the military actions of peace-keeping within the
framework of the OSCE, Malta is marginalising itself from developments and consequently
diminishing its influence.
The general perception about Malta's security - shared by all political parties - is that any threat
to its security will not be of a military nature. Given this consideration and if the acute North-
South adversarial relationship which Malta perceives in the Mediterranean region is non-existent,
than there are also implications for its neutrality, namely that carried to extremes such as staying
out of the PfP, the EU or OSCE operations is unwarranted and does not appear to be conducive
towards achieving the other stated goal of maintaining stability in the Mediterranean region. One
view of the problem is that a policy of adhering to the sui generis meaning of neutrality, that of
not having military bases on Malta's soil, but participating as a full member of the EU viewed as
a security community as well as in other peace-keeping structures, gives Malta greater relevance
and permits it to be in the core of the decision-making processes that most concern the regional
environment in which it has to live and survive.
Given all these considerations, a rethinking of present policies is not a farfetched assumption and
this is an added reason why the present approach to Malta's future relations with the EU may yet
be reconsidered.
(B) Cyprus
The main obstacle to the membership of Cyprus is the "Cyprus Problem". The rudiments of this
problem are the following (63):
(i) If Cyprus joins the EU, without a solution to the Cyprus problem, Turkey has repeatedly
promised annexation of the Northern Republic of Cyprus in the shortest possible time. It will
mean that Turkey, an applicant for future membership, with a customs union agreement with the
EU will have annexed a part of the Community's territory. It will also mean that part of the
Community's territory will be under the military occupation of a third country. This will ensure
that the issue will be a permanent feature of the European Council. However, much depends on
whether the EU member states would allow Turkey to get away with this and block Cyprus’s
membership. British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Malcolm
Rifkind, has stated that no third party would have a veto on whether Cyprus would join the
European Union, though if a solution was found to the Cyprus Problem, it would make
negotiations easier (64).
(ii) Turkey claims that Cypriot constitution prohibits the entry of Cyprus in the EU without the
consent of the three guarantors. This appears to be a true legal obstacle to membership. However,
by virtue of another development, following the signing of the customs union agreement with the
EU, Turkey should be banning exports from the TRNC since on the basis of a European Court
decision (65) of July 5th 1994, exports of citrus fruits and potatoes from Cyprus should not be
admitted in the EC's customs territory unless accompanied by the proper certification issued by
the competent (in this case Greek Cypriot) authorities (66). Turkey's position is thus weakened
because it cannot stress one legal point while ignoring the other.
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(iii) Cyprus claims that membership of the EU will help resolve the Cyprus Problem while the
attitude of the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, appears to confirm that in fact the membership issue
is making both sides more intransigent. In order to lessen the intransigence on both sides, the
European Commission's opinion had made the solution of the Cyprus problem a precondition of
membership while giving a two-year breathing space after which ( i.e. in January 1995) it would
re-evaluate the whole issue. The latter step was intended to mitigate Turkish-Cypriot
intransigence. In December 1993, the EU appointed its observer to the UN-sponsored peace
talks, a move opposed by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.
However, by that time, the inter communal talks had reached stalemate and the Security Council
of the UN blamed this on the military balance between the two sides. As a way of breaking out
of the impasse, the Cypriot President Clerides wrote to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros
Ghali, in 1993 proposing the demilitarisation of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots claimed that the
Turkish military presence in Cyprus meant that Cyprus had to purchase more arms and request
Greece to include her in the Greek defensive plans. However, Cyprus was ready to achieve
demilitarisation of the island on the following basis: (a) disbandment of the national guard; (b)
maintenance of the police force of the republic at its present numerical level and armed with light
arms; (c) undertake the total cost of a substantially increased UN peace-keeping force; (d) the
UN peace-keeping force will have the right of inspection to ensure compliance; (e) agree that the
National Guard heavy armour vehicles be used to patrol the buffer zone by the UN; (f) deposit
with the UN the difference between the money saved from disbanding the National Guard and
the money used to pay for the increased UN force. The proposal included that for their part, the
Turkish army had to withdraw from Cyprus while the Turkish Cypriots were to disband their
own forces in line with what the Greek Cypriots proposed to do. Cyprus affirmed that if these
proposals were not accepted, it would be incumbent on it to "increase the defensive capabilities
of the Republic and to enter into arrangements with Greece regarding a common defensive plan"
(67). In early 1994, both Cypriot communities showed readiness to embark on confidence
building measures (CBMs) suggested by the UN Secretary General way back in 1992 (68).
However, when the EU observer visited the island in February, the Turkish-Cypriot leader
Denktash refused to meet him. The first round of "proximity talks" to implement the CBMs
between leaders of the two communities took place in Nicosia on March 1st, 1994. Both the UN
Security Council (69) and the EU urged that the talks should not be protracted and that they
should be concluded by the end of March. In a report to the Security Council released on April
5th, 1994, the UN Secretary General showed that the talks were deadlocked and a month later he
pronounced them dead due largely to Turkish Cypriot intransigence (70), something confirmed
by Lord Finsberg's report to the General Assembly of the Council of Europe (71). This setback
was followed in June by the decision of the Corfu summit that Malta and Cyprus would be
included in the next enlargement and then by the July 5th European Court decision curtailing
Turkish-Cypriot imports of citrus fruits and potatoes in the EU (72). At this point Greece and
Cyprus began to co-ordinate their efforts more closely on the Cypriot EU application packaging
it in the assertion that membership would facilitate the resolution of the Cyprus problem and in
fact benefit both Cypriot communities. By early 1995, Greece's efforts and most especially its
blocking of further progress on the EU-Turkey customs union agreement yielded the desired
result with the decision that the EU would begin accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta
six months after the end of the IGC. This move met a Turkish warning, previously repeated on a
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number of occasions, that in the event of Cypriot membership of the EU, Northern Cyprus would
be annexed by Turkey.
In the meantime, the stalemate in the intercommunal talks meant that neither the CBMs nor the
Greek Cypriot offer of demilitarisation stood a chance of becoming a reality and the arms race on
the island was intensified with Cyprus acquiring the French MM-40 surface-to-surface Exocet
missiles. Co-operation between Greece and Cyprus under the aegis of the 1994 Joint Defence
Agreement was intensified pledging a "joint struggle against all adversaries" (73). In June 1995
UN Secretary General proposed Turkish troop reductions in Cyprus and in return a freeze in
defence spending by the Greek Cypriots. Again Cyprus reiterated its call for demilitarisation
(74). In the meantime work started on the construction of an air base on the island for the
permanent deployment of Greek military aircraft while on the diplomatic front the USA and the
EU continued with several unsuccessful efforts to find a solution to the impasse. In May 1996,
Greek Foreign Minister, Theodoros Pangalos, described the Cyprus Problem as the only factor
preventing Greco-Turkish trust (75). In June 1996, the situation in Cyprus nearly flared up again
when Turkish soldiers killed a Greek Cypriot National Guardsman as he entered unarmed in the
UN buffer zone. This incident was followed by another more serious incident in August when
scuffles broke out in the buffer zone between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, leaving two unarmed
Greek Cypriots dead, one of them shot by a Turkish soldier as he climbed up a flag pole to
remove the Turkish flag. In a resolution approved by the European Parliament in September
1996, these acts were condemned. The Community was called upon to stop financial aid to
Turkey while the latter was strongly asked to clarify its position on four issues: human rights,
democratisation, the Cyprus question and the Kurdish problem (76). Further diplomatic efforts
ended the year on a very optimistic note that direct negotiations between the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots could begin in the first half of 1997. However, 1997 commenced with tension heating
up again between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey over plans by Cyprus to purchase a missile system
from Russia. After a meeting with Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides, in Nicosia on Sunday
12th, January, US mediator Carey Cavanaugh said that the former had assured him that no part
of the surface-to-air missiles Cyprus had ordered from Russia would be delivered before 16
months. "I believe this should diffuse the crisis", he said, adding that he had not at all asked
Cyprus to cancel the order. Beforehand, Moscow had strongly criticised Turkish Foreign
Minister Tansu Ciller, who had said that her country was ready to "strike" were the Russian
missiles deployed in Cyprus (77).
The situation in Cyprus is reaching a dangerous pitch and bringing about immense discord
between Turkey and Greece, something which is detrimental to the unity of NATO presently
entering a very crucial stage in its existence. The aim of the arms race embarked upon by Greece
and Cyprus may have two main aims in mind: to raise the costs of the Turkish occupation in
northern Cyprus and to heighten tension to a pitch so as not to allow the international diplomatic
effort at a solution of the Cyprus problem from relaxing. This has elicited efforts from various
quarters but notably from the United States, the EU and the United Kingdom (the other guarantor
of the Cypriot constitution) to try and find a solution to the problem. It is not likely though that
Greece and Cyprus are serious about a military solution to the Cyprus problem. At the same
time, although Turkey insists that Cyprus cannot become a member of the EU without its
consent, the EU cannot accept this for it makes the Turkish Cypriots more intransigent in the
inter communal talks and would entail that the EU accepts that a third country can effectively
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veto an applicant’s membership. Hence it is reasonable to expect that the EU accession
negotiations with Cyprus will commence on time and Cyprus will become a member of the EU,
while Turkish threats are ignored. The integration or annexation of the Turkish Republic of
Cyprus with Turkey may then happen or not happen at all. Turkey will be loathe to sacrifice its
stronger position in the EU following the conclusion of the EU-Turkey customs union for the
sake of Northern Cyprus and in all likelihood would fall short of the drastic step of annexation.
In such a scenario, TRNC will have a comparable position of that of East Germany before
German unification: when a solution is eventually found to the Cyprus Problem the TRNC will
be assimilated.
In the first half of 1997 direct inter communal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are
expected to start. Time is running out for the TRNC which will have to decide its future soon.
International isolation has meant that it has become an economic back water. Not only has this
isolation hampered it from developing a manufacturing base and tourism, but it has also led to a
situation in which the TRNC could not exploit the immense agricultural potential left behind by
the fleeing Greek Cypriots. Besides, it has refused financial aid under the EC-Cyprus Financial
Protocols earmarked for joint Greek-Turkish Cypriot projects because it does not want to submit
project proposals through the Cypriot Government. It has also been isolated from the economic
forces of modernisation unleashed in the south by the legal and economic restructuring in
preparation for EU membership.
The north-south gap in Cyprus will continue to widen if the TRNC does not form part of the EU
territory. Agriculture in Northern Cyprus will also benefit considerably from EU membership.
On the other hand there are justifiable fears on the part of the Turkish Cypriots that if proper
safeguards are not put in place, the whole of the poorer Turkish-Cypriot economy as well as land
and property in the northern part of the island will be taken over by Greek Cypriot business
concerns. Then there is the traditional fear regarding the safety of the Turkish Community in a
unified republic. None of these problems are insurmountable, given an acceptable time frame
and proper guarantees. A lot will depend on Turkey's attitude as well. So far Turkey has
attempted to use the Cyprus Problem to extract concessions from the Union in a parallel way as
Greece and Cyprus have used the question of Turkey’s membership in order to squeeze
concessions from Turkey on the same problem and other outstanding issues with Greece. Both
sides seem to have flogged the horse dead and will have to content themselves with unfulfilled
wishes as long as they are intransigent. The prospect for the EU and for NATO of the persistence
of the Cyprus Problem is such that untold efforts will no doubt be made during 1997 to resolve
the issue. It remains to be seen what Turkey will manage to extract from all this.
(c) Turkey
Turkey’s membership of the EU poses two kinds of problems - economic and political. The
economic problems are related to Turkey’s size and the level of its economic development, given
that this is about a fifth of the poorest EU Mediterranean member state. The economic dynamism
which has been exhibited by the Turkish economy in recent years will not obliterate this reality.
The political problems are related to its relations with Greece, the Cyprus Problem and internally
the human rights situation.
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Turkey exhibits enormous haste in joining the EU. However, this has not always been the case.
For a long stretch of time covering around two decades following the signing of the Ankara
Agreement in 1963, due to a number of internal political and economic problems, Turkey
showed extreme reluctance at hurrying the momentum of achieving closer integration with the
Community. The disenchantment with the whole relationship was clear when the Turkish
Foreign Minister said in 1974 that his country did not share Greece’s urgency in joining the EC.
Again, during those years Turkey constantly complained with the Community that it was biased
towards Greece in the Aegean dispute (78). Relations with the Community were worsened by the
1974 invasion of Cyprus. Further difficulties in the EC-Turkey relationship were introduced by
the intervention of the Turkish military in domestic politics and the general deterioration in the
human rights situation.
Human rights have always played an important role in the Union’s dealings with the
Mediterranean associates. The agreement with Greece had been frozen after the colonels coup in
1967 while Spain’s request for an Association Agreement based on article 238 were rebuffed
pending substantial progress in democratisation. It was only after Franco’s death that relations
between the EC and Spain were normalised. The respect for human rights is a binding feature of
the Europe Agreements and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements. Given this
emphasis, when the European Parliament’s statutory approval was sought for the EU-Turkey
customs union agreement and the financial protocol in December 1995, Turkey’s Human rights
record came under attack in the Parliament with the leader of the socialist group stating most
emphatically that the majority of her group were voting in favour of ratification "...in sorrow,
with heavy hearts and without enthusiasm" (79). The agreement provided for the establishment
of a Customs Union Joint Committee (CUJC) to approve acts. It also means that Turkey will
have to conclude bilateral trading arrangements with third countries which have preferential
trading arrangements with the EU, a process which is planned to last no more than five years.
The coming into force of the agreement coincided with a sharp rise in the EU’s exports to
Turkey and a deterioration in Turkey’s balance of payments. The Turks were quick to blame this
on the customs union agreement and to demand that the EU release promised financial aid
blocked by Greece. The Commission’s appraisal is that much of the imbalance may have been
more due to overheating of the economy (80). The customs union agreement was accompanied
by a financial aid package made up of ECU 375 million in budgetary aid and ECU 750 million in
EIB loans. However, following the events of January 1996 around Imia island in the Aegean, this
aid was blocked on the insistence of Greece. In July, the European Council issued a declaration
(81) on relations between the EU and Turkey making reference to the Imia islet incident and
calling for the avoidance of any action liable to increase tensions and specifically against the use
of force. Turkey was asked whether it would commit itself to the principles stated in the
declaration, but no reply was forthcoming. The Commission has also referred to the lack of
legislative initiative in Turkey, which has resulted in no progress being made on democratic
reforms and fundamental human rights. Turkey has pleaded that it is going through an awkward
time in its history when it has to fight the "terrorist" movement of the Khurds (PKK) which has
criminal connections. The EU’s reply is that the fight against terrorism must be carried out
within the respect of human rights. All indicators are that the human rights situation will not
easily be normalised in Turkey while internal politics are becoming more turbulent, impinging
upon economic decision-making, most especially retarding Turkey’s ability to regain macro
economic balance. On the external front there appears to be the usual Turkish intransigence on
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issues related to the Aegean and Cyprus. These are of serious concern to the unity of NATO and
present a major obstacle to Turkey’s aspirations to join the Community. More than the Cyprus
question, the biggest obstacle to Turkey’s membership is the process of democratisation and
respect for human rights - not to mention the need of establishing the internal social consensus
over which direction Turkey wants to embark on its external relations (82). Of course the
situation is also exasperated by Greek intransigence.
Given the above economic and political considerations, it will be very unlikely that the EU will
change its position on Turkey’s membership in the foreseeable future. The most that Turkey may
hope to extract from the present situation is the release of blocked EU financial aid promised to
her with the customs union agreement.
Conclusion
It is not the aim of this paper to foretell the future, but to examine present trends and
developments in order to try and map out the direction in which events will develop. It appears
that the Mediterranean enlargement will follow this course: Cyprus is the most likely candidate
to be in the next intake, probably around 1999 (most optimistic and perhaps not realistic
scenario) if all goes smoothly with the IGC and the ratification process. It is much likelier that
membership will come after that date. The basic assumption in this case is that although
Cyprus’s application is problematic, Greece will manage to push it through. Malta certainly
intends to stay out, though there is the likely possibility that it will have a last minute change of
mind. Turkey will definitely not make it in the next Mediterranean enlargement. The most
important obstacle Turkey faces in its relations with Europe is the process of democratisation and
respect for human rights as well as relations with Greece, already an EU member. These are not
issues which will be resolved easily, and hence on present considerations it can be said with a
degree of certainty that Turkey will not be in the next enlargement.
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